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McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 George Salemo brings this appeal after being sentenced for a 
crime commonly known as "check kiting."1  Although he challenges 
his sentence on numerous grounds, we need only address his claim 
that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at 
sentencing. Because we find this assertion to have merit we will 
remand for resentencing. 
 
I. 
 On September 24, 1992, a federal grand jury returned a two-
count indictment charging Salemo with bank fraud in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1344.  Prior to trial, the public defender who had 
been appointed to represent Salemo was allowed to withdraw, and 
the district court then appointed an attorney of Salemo's own 
choosing to represent Salemo at trial. After a two day trial, the 
jury convicted Salemo of both counts. 
 Sentencing was originally set for January 10, 1994, however, 
on three separate occasions, Salemo moved pro se for a 
continuance of the sentencing date and the district court granted 
each request.  On March 1, 1994, Salemo wrote to his trial 
attorney and asked him to withdraw as counsel.  Salemo also wrote 
                     
1Salemo raises a plethora of issues regarding his trial.  He 
complains that the indictment was duplicitous and inadequately 
charged him with bank fraud; that the government failed to 
disclose exculpatory information; that the trial court improperly 
excluded evidence; that the trial court's jury instruction on 
constructive control was misleading and that a misstatement of 
certain facts by the court created a risk of an unjust verdict; 
and, that his sentence in this case violates the double jeopardy 
provision of the Fifth Amendment.  We find these contentions to 
be without merit. 
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to the district court and requested new counsel and yet another 
postponement of the sentencing.  He stated that given his request 
for a change of counsel, he needed the continuance in order to 
have an opportunity to meet with an attorney and adequately 
prepare for sentencing.   The sentencing hearing finally 
proceeded on April 4, 1994.  At the beginning of that hearing the 
following discussion occurred between the district judge, 
Salemo's appointed counsel and Salemo: 
THE COURT:  We're ready for the sentence of Mr. Salemo, 
but I understand that there are some preliminary 
matters which we need to deal with. 
 
The first is Mr. Salemo may not wish to have you, 
[trial counsel].  I don't know. 
 
[TRIAL COUNSEL]:  I'm perfectly aware of that, Your 
Honor.  We have talked at length about it. 
 
THE COURT:  Do you wish to remain with him at counsel 
table or does he wish for you to step back and remain 
available as a standby counsel? 
 
[TRIAL COUNSEL]:  I will tell the Court what I told Mr. 
Salemo on several occasions.  I will not withdraw 
voluntarily.  If he does not want me seated here, I 
shall step back. . . . 
 
THE COURT:  Mr. Salemo, do you wish to state anything 
in regard to [trial counsel]? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, Your Honor.  As far as the 
sentencing today, again, I'm going to reiterate my 
request that it be continued. 
 
THE COURT:  Well, first we have to determine -- we're 
not there yet.  We're going to deal with that. 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  All right.  No, I had, as of March 1st, 
I wrote [my attorney] the letter that I've submitted to 
the Court, which I don't know if you received it in the 
mail on Friday -- 
 
THE COURT:  Yes. 
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THE DEFENDANT:  -- and I had asked him to withdraw.  He 
came and saw me at Fairton and we spent about ten, 
fifteen minutes together and I was under the 
understanding that he was going to withdraw.  I guess 
we had a misunderstanding that he was going to wait and 
see what the Court said. . . .  
 
We have not discussed the pre-sentence at all, I mean 
not in the slightest, and we haven't discussed the 
sentencing problems at all.  Therefore, if we went 
ahead with the sentencing, I would have to represent 
myself.  [Trial counsel] is not prepared to do that 
based -- and I filed an awful lot of material as the 
Court is aware on this -- on any of the issues or any 
of the problems with the pre-sentence report. . . .  
 
I would prefer other representation. 
 
THE COURT:  Well, that's why we continued the case the 
last time.  This is not the first time you've been 
brought down for sentencing. 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  No, I understand that, Your Honor, very 
definitely. 
 
THE COURT:  And we thought that the reasons to continue 
the last sentencing were weak, but . . . we thought 
we'd give you the benefit of the doubt and extend --
continue the sentencing till today, but we're not 
willing to continue it any further. 
 
So we'll proceed. 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Then I would have to represent myself, 
Your Honor. . . . 
 
I don't know how he could represent me, not knowing any 
of the issues.  You know, no slight to [trial counsel], 
but he doesn't -- 
 
THE COURT:  Well, we've looked at what you've submitted 
-- 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  -- but he doesn't have a crystal ball, 
either. 
 
THE COURT: -- and there doesn't seem to be much in 
issue. 
 
Why don't we go through what you want to raise and see 
if there's anything in it that has any merit.  On the 
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surface, it doesn't seem to have any merit; but maybe 
I'm missing something and we'll give you an opportunity 
to explain. 
 
Let's take your points one by one and we'll deal with 
them in that way. 
 
What's your first point? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  May I sit, Your Honor? 
 
THE COURT:  Sure. 
 
Why don't you stay there in case -- he doesn't bother 
you sitting there, right? 
 
[TRIAL COUNSEL]:  Better not.  I've known him for too 
long. 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  No, no, not at all.  [My attorney] and 
I have known each other -- we're friends.  We've known 
each other for 20 years. 
 
THE COURT:  Okay. 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  That's not a personal slight at all. 
 
THE COURT:  Okay.  Okay. 
 
App. at 525-28 (Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, April 4, 1994). 
 The district court then listened as Salemo argued the 
inaccuracy of the pre-sentence report and the application of case 
law to his situation.  After rejecting Salemo's arguments, the 
district court imposed a sentence of ninety-six months 
imprisonment, followed by five years supervised release, 
restitution of $15,000, no fine, and a $100 special assessment.   
 
II. 
 When Salemo filed the notice of appeal from his sentence he 
requested appointment of counsel, and the district court 
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appointed appellate counsel who filed a brief on Salemo's behalf. 
Salemo has also filed a pro se brief in this appeal.2 
 Salemo raises an issue in his pro se brief that was not 
raised in the brief submitted by his attorney on appeal.  Salemo 
claims that his purported waiver of counsel at the sentencing 
hearing was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and that the 
sentencing court therefore erred in allowing him to represent 
himself at sentencing.  The government concedes that the trial 
court did not engage in an inquiry with Salemo to ascertain the 
extent of his understanding of the ramifications of dispensing 
with counsel and proceeding pro se at the sentencing hearing. 
Nevertheless, the government argues that "[t]he record that was 
before the trial court showed that Salemo understood the nature 
of the sentencing proceeding and the possible consequences." 
Brief for Appellee at 34.  The government further claims that the 
trial court properly inferred that Salemo's waiver of counsel was 
knowing and intelligent and that the record supports that 
implicit finding. 
A. 
  The Supreme Court has recognized that a criminal defendant 
has the constitutional right to defend him/herself at trial. 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 814-16 (1975); Adams v. 
                     
2
      This case presents one of the rare instances in which a 
defendant who is represented by court appointed appellate counsel 
is also allowed to brief his own appeal before this Court. We 
emphasize that ordinarily we do not consider the pro se briefs of 
counselled parties and we do not intend our consideration of the 
dual briefs filed on behalf of the defendant in this case to 
signal a departure from our usual practice to the contrary. 
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United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942) (the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel implicitly includes the "correlative 
right to dispense with a lawyer's help").  The Court, however, 
has scrupulously required that a defendant's waiver of counsel be 
both voluntary and a "knowing and intelligent relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege."  Edwards v. Arizona, 
451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981).  Whether a defendant has voluntarily, 
knowingly and intelligently relinquished the right to counsel 
"depends in each case 'upon the particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, 
experience, and conduct of the accused.'"  Id. (quoting Johnson 
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).  In general, however, the 
Supreme Court has required that "courts indulge in every 
reasonable presumption against waiver."  Brewer v. Williams, 430 
U.S. 387, 404 (1977). 
 In United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185 (3d Cir. 1982), we 
set forth guidelines for conducting a proper inquiry following a 
defendant's request for substitution or waiver of counsel:  
First, the court must decide if the reasons 
for the defendant's request for substitute 
counsel constitute good cause and are thus 
sufficiently substantial to justify a 
continuance of the trial in order to allow 
new counsel to be obtained.  If the district 
court determines that the defendant is not 
entitled to a continuance in order to engage 
new counsel, the defendant is then left with 
a choice between continuing with his existing 
counsel or proceeding to trial pro se, thus 
bringing into play the court's second stage 
of inquiry.  Since the decision to proceed 
pro se involves a waiver of the defendant's 
sixth amendment right to counsel, the 
district court then has the responsibility of 
ensuring that any decision by the defendant 
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to represent him[/her]self is intelligently 
and competently made.   
 
 It is vital that the district court take 
particular pains in discharging its 
responsibility to conduct these inquiries 
concerning substitution of counsel and waiver 
of counsel. . . . [A] trial cannot be 
permitted to go forward when a defendant does 
not fully appreciate the impact of his[/her] 
actions on his[/her] fundamental 
constitutional rights. 
Id. at 187 (citation omitted). 
 In Welty, we concluded that the defendant could not have 
effectively waived his right to counsel because "the record 
reveal[ed] no inquiry by the district court judge as to the 
reasons for Welty's dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel 
and little inquiry into whether Welty's decision to proceed pro 
se was made knowingly and intelligently."  Id. at 189. Similarly, 
in McMahon v. Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1987), we held that 
the defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right 
to counsel where the "record reflect[ed] a total absence of any 
`searching inquiry' or colloquy as to defendant's understanding 
of the dangers and disadvantages he faced proceeding pro se."  
Id. at 945.   
 Conversely, we upheld the validity of a defendant's waiver 
of counsel in Government of Virgin Islands v. James, 934 F.2d 468 
(3d Cir. 1991).  There, the trial court was not presented with a 
request for substitute counsel as James sought only to represent 
himself.  Throughout the pre-trial proceedings James had been 
represented by a public defender.  However, when jury selection 
was to begin James told the court that he wanted to discharge his 
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attorney and represent himself. Id. at 470.  The district judge 
conducted a lengthy colloquy with James in which the court 
informed him of the perils of self-representation.  Id. at 470. 
On review, we considered the contents of that colloquy and 
concluded that James' waiver was knowing and intelligent: 
After admonishing appellant with the old 
adage that a lawyer who has himself for a 
client is a fool, the court discussed the 
nature of the possible charges against James 
and the possible penalties he faced; James 
was apprised of the difficulty he would face 
in getting his decision to waive overturned 
on appeal from a conviction; the court 
determined that James had some familiarity 
with the workings of a trial as a result of 
two prior convictions; the court also 
determined that James' waiver was voluntary. 
. . . Most significantly, the court did not 
allow James to proceed completely unassisted 
but appointed stand-by counsel to sit with 
him and answer any questions that he may have 
had during trial.   
Id. at 472-73.3 
B. 
 The issue before us is, of course, raised in a different 
context as Salemo's purported waiver occurred at sentencing as 
opposed to trial.  This distinction is clearly relevant to the 
content of the colloquy which the court must have with the 
defendant.  It does not, however, eliminate the need for the 
district court to make an inquiry sufficient to support a finding 
that the waiver of counsel is voluntary, knowing and intelligent. 
 It is well settled that "[i]t is the solemn duty of a 
                     
3
      James was also required to execute a waiver form attesting 
that the waiver was made voluntarily and with full knowledge and 
understanding.  Id. at 470 n.2. 
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federal judge before whom a defendant appears without counsel to 
make a thorough inquiry and to take all steps necessary to insure 
the fullest protection of this constitutional right at every 
stage of the proceedings."  Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 
722 (1948) (Black, J., plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
Neither logic nor precedent supports carving out an exception 
when the waiver occurs at sentencing.  Of course, the inquiry at 
sentencing need only be tailored to that proceeding and the 
consequences that may flow from it. Therefore, it need not be as 
exhaustive and searching as a similar inquiry before the 
conclusion of trial. "Sentencing hearings demand much less 
specialized knowledge than trials; for instance, the Federal 
Rules of Evidence do not apply in sentencing hearings."  United 
States v. Day, 998 F.2d 622, 626 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 
114 S. Ct. 2140 (1994).  Nevertheless, sentencing is a critical 
and often times complicated part of the criminal process that 
contains subtleties which may be beyond the appreciation of the 
average layperson seeking to represent him/herself.  
 We have, for example, previously noted that "[t]he 
[Sentencing] Guidelines contain a complex procedure for 
determining the appropriate increase in offense level for 
conviction of multiple counts."  United States v. Johnson, 931 
F.2d 238, 242 (3d Cir. 1991).  See also United States v. Smith, 
997 F.2d 396, 398 (8th Cir. 1993) (Gibson, J., concurring) ("The 
guidelines . . . have created a complex hypertechnical system 
consuming great amounts of judicial time for both trial and 
appellate judges.").  Commentators have also bemoaned the 
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complexities of our sentencing system.  Id. at 399 (Bright, J., 
dissenting) (citing articles that "call attention to the 
frustrations of lawyers, judges and probation officers who must 
try to understand the complexities of the [sentencing] system"). 
 Indeed, in some cases, one's ultimate fate is determined 
more by the application of the Guidelines than the determination 
of innocence or guilt.  For example, sentencing judges are not 
limited to a consideration of the specific conduct that 
constitutes the offense of conviction in determining whether a 
given offense characteristic applies.  Under USSG § 1B1.3, a 
judge generally must consider all "relevant conduct."4  Thus, 
"[t]he Guidelines are clear that conduct beyond the precise acts 
of the offense of conviction may be used to determine specific 
offense characteristics."  United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 
650, 653 (3d Cir. 1991).  Accordingly, we have upheld sentences 
                     
4
      Section 1B1.3 of the Guidelines states: 
 
 Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guideline 
Range) 
 
Unless otherwise specified, . . . specific 
offense characteristics . . . shall be 
determined on the basis of . . . all acts and 
omissions committed or aided and abetted by 
the defendant, or for which the defendant 
would be otherwise accountable, that occurred 
during the commission of the offense of 
conviction, in preparation for that offense, 
. . . or that otherwise were in furtherance 
of that offense. 
 
USSG § 1B1.3(a).  For certain crimes, relevant conduct also 
includes any acts or omissions that were "part of the same course 
of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of 
conviction." USSG § 1B1.3(a)(2). 
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which were based in part upon conduct for which the defendant was 
not convicted.  See United States v. Cianscewski, 894 F.2d 74, 
80-81 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 608-09 
(3d Cir. 1989).  Given these intricacies, it is particularly 
important that a sentencing court be certain that a defendant 
understands the perilous path he/she is going down in attempting 
to proceed to sentencing without the benefit of counsel.  
 In addition, a defendant who is unfamiliar with the post 
conviction process may inadvertently waive a meritorious argument 
that he/she might otherwise have raised on appeal.  Thus, at 
sentencing, just as at trial, "a defendant's waiver of counsel 
can be deemed effective only where the district court has made a 
searching inquiry sufficient to satisfy him[/her] that the 
defendant's waiver was understanding and voluntary."  Welty, 674 
F.2d at 189.  We have not previously, nor do we now, require a 
rote dialogue "such as that mandated for guilty plea proceedings 
conducted pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure."  James, 934 F.2d at 473. However, at a minimum, a 
trial judge must make "a searching inquiry sufficient to satisfy 
him[/her] that the defendant's waiver was understanding and 
voluntary."  Welty, 674 F.2d at 189.  The court's inquiry must be 
calculated to insure that the defendant is "made aware of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the 
record will establish that 'he[/she] knows what he[/she] is doing 
and [the] choice is made with eyes open.'" Faretta, 422 U.S. at 
834 (quoting Adams, 317 U.S. at 279).  "Perfunctory questioning 
is not sufficient." Welty, 674 F.2d at 187.  Where the record 
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contains no such inquiry, or one that is inadequate, there can be 
no valid waiver of the right to counsel. Salemo's purported 
waiver was accepted without such an inquiry and therefore it 
cannot stand.   
C. 
 The inquiry required here did not have to include a 
discussion of the reasons for Salemo's request for a continuance 
in order to get new counsel because Salemo clearly stated the 
reasons for his dissatisfaction when he requested another 
continuance of the sentencing date. See McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 
927, 933 (2d Cir. 1981).  When a defendant insists on proceeding 
pro se, the next inquiry a court must make under Welty is whether 
the defendant's request for waiver of counsel is voluntary, 
knowing and intelligent.  Here, Salemo's own language casts doubt 
upon the voluntariness of his request.  Although a defendant can 
be deemed to have waived the right to counsel by refusing the 
assistance of appointed counsel and persisting in a demand for 
different counsel, see Wiggins v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 1318, 1320 
(5th Cir. 1985), a defendant will not normally be deemed to have 
waived the right to counsel by reluctantly agreeing to proceed 
pro se under circumstances where it may appear that there is no 
choice.  See United States ex rel. Martinez v. Thomas, 526 F.2d 
750, 755-56 (2d Cir. 1975) (defendant who represented himself 
"reluctantly, unwillingly and greatly to his detriment" had "no 
freedom of choice" but was merely "bowing to the inevitable," and 
was thereby denied his constitutional rights).  Here, the 
circumstances were such that the district court had an obligation 
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to make a sufficient inquiry of the defendant to allow the court 
to decide whether the defendant was "bowing to the inevitable" or 
voluntarily and affirmatively waiving his right to counsel.  
 We do not, however, suggest that the district court should 
have allowed itself to be manipulated into granting a continuance 
and appointing new counsel.  Nevertheless, the defendant's 
apparent reluctance to proceed without counsel should have 
alerted the court to the need to inform the defendant of the 
pitfalls and technicalities of the sentencing hearing which was 
about to begin.  Such a warning would have better enabled the 
defendant to decide if he still wanted to proceed pro se instead 
of allowing counsel, who was standing at his side, to represent 
him.  
 We appreciate that the sentencing judge (who also conducted 
Salemo's trial) may have felt that he had sufficient familiarity 
with this defendant to accept a waiver of counsel for purposes of 
sentencing without a searching inquiry into Salemo's familiarity 
with, or appreciation of, the complexities of sentencing.  Before 
sentencing, Salemo, acting pro se, filed several documents 
including an extensive challenge to the pre-sentence report, 
objections to the revised pre-sentence report, a sentencing 
memorandum, a letter to the trial court objecting to the 
government's sentencing memorandum, and voluminous exhibits in 
support of his arguments.5  Thus, we can understand how the 
                     
5
  In addition, at his sentencing, Salemo made respectable 
legal arguments (citing cases which were, for the most part, 
relevant to his argument), argued the application of specific 
16 
sentencing judge may have concluded that Salemo was better able 
to represent himself than the average defendant.  However, we 
cannot infer a valid waiver of the right to counsel based upon 
the district court's subjective overall impression of a 
defendant.  We have previously stated "that a colloquy between 
the defendant and trial judge is the preferred method of 
ascertaining that a waiver is voluntary, knowing and 
intelligent."  James, 934 F.2d at 473.  See also Wiggins, 753 
F.2d at 1320 ("We are convinced that a colloquy between a 
defendant and a trial judge is the preferred method of 
ascertaining that a waiver is voluntary, knowing and 
intelligent.").  We reiterate that "[i]t is appropriate for this 
searching inquiry to appear upon the record," McMahon, 821 F.2d 
at 945, so as to allow a reviewing court to examine the district 
court's determination in the event of an appeal.  Here, the 
district court's failure to do this requires a remand for 
resentencing.   
 Moreover, we decline to engage in a harmless error analysis 
here.  The right to representation by counsel in a criminal 
proceeding is one of the most fundamental and cherished rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution.  See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462 
(describing assistance of counsel as "one of the safeguards of 
the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human 
rights of life and liberty").  It is "among those `constitutional 
rights [which are] so basic to a fair trial that their infraction 
                                                                  
provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines, and he has now 
successfully presented a legal argument to this Court on appeal. 
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can never be treated as harmless error.'"  Welty, 674 F.2d at 196 
n.6 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.8 
(1967)).  Furthermore, the purpose and effect of the Sixth 
Amendment is to "withhold[] from federal courts, in all criminal 
proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his 
life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of 
counsel."  Johnson, 304 U.S. at 463 (footnotes omitted). 
Accordingly, we do not feel that the deprivation of the 
defendant's right to representation at sentencing under the 
circumstances of this case justifies a harmless error analysis. 
 In summary, we do not believe that the district court's 
instruction for Salemo's appointed counsel to serve as standby 
counsel during the sentencing is a sufficient substitute for 
obtaining a valid waiver of the right to counsel from the 
defendant.  Although the court's instruction was a noteworthy 
attempt to safeguard Salemo's Sixth Amendment right, it did not 
satisfy the court's "responsibility of ensuring that any choice 
of self-representation is made . . . with an awareness of the 
dangers and disadvantages inherent in representing oneself." 
Welty, 674 F.2d at 188.    
III. 
 Salemo raises several other issues pertaining to his 
sentencing.  He claims that the district court improperly 
calculated the amount of loss by "double counting" the same funds 
as both actual and intended loss.  He argues that his sentence 
level should be reduced by three points because his federal 
conviction in Florida and state conviction in Arizona were part 
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of a common scheme as defined in USSG § 4A1.2.  Further, Salemo 
objects to the two point enhancement he received for "more than 
minimal planning" and complains that he was improperly denied a 
two point reduction for acceptance of responsibility.  Lastly, 
Salemo, through the brief submitted by his counsel, complains 
that he did not receive "sufficient notice" of the potential for 
sentence enhancement for commission of a crime while on bail 
release, as required by the Background Commentary accompanying 
USSG § 2J1.7.  We decline to take any position as to the merits 
of any of these arguments now.  On remand, these arguments can be 
presented to the sentencing court by competent legal counsel, or 
by the defendant after an appropriate waiver of counsel.  
 We will affirm the judgment of conviction but will vacate 
the sentence and remand for resentencing. 
19 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge. concurring:  
 
 I would not write separately here if the majority opinion did 
not include the following paragraph in its opinion.   
 Moreover, we decline to engage in a harmless error 
analysis here. The right to representation by counsel 
in a criminal proceeding is one of the most fundamental 
and cherished rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 
See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462 (describing assistance of 
counsel as "one of the safeguards of the Sixth 
Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human 
rights of life and liberty").  It is "among those 
'constitutional rights [which are] so basic to a fair 
trial that their infraction can never be treated as 
harmless error.'"  Welty, 674 F.2d at 196 n.6 (quoting 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.8 (1967)). 
Furthermore, the purpose and the effect of the Sixth 
Amendment is to "withhold[] from federal courts, in all 
criminal proceedings, the power and authority to 
deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has 
or waives the assistance of counsel."  Johnson, 304 
U.S. at 463 (footnotes omitted).  Accordingly, we do 
not feel that the deprivation of the defendant's right 
to representation at sentencing under the circumstances 
of this case justifies a harmless error analysis. 
 
Maj. Op. 15-16. 
 
 If this paragraph is narrowly interpreted to mean only that 
the error in this case was not harmless, then this paragraph is 
correct -- but unnecessary -- for nobody has ever claimed that 
the challenged actions of the district court, if they amounted to 
constitutional error, could be found, based on the record that we 
have, to have been harmless.  The government's brief made no such 
20 
argument, and at oral argument the government emphasized that it 
was not advancing any such claim. 
 I am concerned, however, that the paragraph in question will 
be interpreted to mean something more than merely that the error 
here was not harmless.  After all, the majority begins this 
paragraph by saying that it "decline[s] to engage in a harmless 
error analysis" (Maj. Op. at 15), not that it concludes, after 
performing such an analysis, that the error was not harmless. 
Similarly, the majority concludes the paragraph by stating that 
"a harmless error analysis" is not "justifie[d]."  Id.  In 
between, the majority inserts quotations, taken from cases 
involving the right to counsel at trial, that strongly suggest 
that the deprivation of counsel can never be harmless.  Thus, the 
paragraph in question may well be read broadly to mean that the 
deprivation of counsel at sentencing can never be harmless 
error.
6
  Such a suggestion would, of course, be dictum and thus 
not binding on our court or on the district courts, but I am not 
prepared to endorse such dictum in this case. 
 In suggesting that the deprivation of counsel can never be 
harmless, the majority quotes two cases -- this court's decision 
                     
6Such a blanket rule could produce some strange results.  For 
example, suppose that a defendant does not validly waive counsel 
at sentencing but is given the mandatory minimum sentence 
prescribed by statute.  Or suppose that a defendant who has not 
validly waived counsel at sentencing is given the minimum 
sentence within the range specified by the Sentencing Guidelines 
and that the defendant, now represented by able counsel, concedes 
that the range calculated by the district court was correct and 
cannot think of any grounds for departure.  In this case, must 
the sentence to be vacated and the case remanded so that the very 
same sentence can be imposed with counsel present?   
21 
in Welty and the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson.  Both of 
these cases concerned the right to counsel at trial, not 
sentencing.  The majority's quotation from Welty includes a 
quotation from Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 & n.8.  The Chapman 
quotation likewise concerns the right to counsel at trial, not 
sentencing.  Now, it may well be that these precedents should be 
extended to govern the deprivation of counsel at sentencing, but 
neither the Supreme Court nor this court has yet done so, and I 
think that such an extension would warrant careful analysis. 
 For one thing, such an extension would require consideration 
of decisions such as Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988), 
that make it clear that the deprivation of counsel in violation 
of the Sixth Amendment can be harmless in some contexts.  In that 
case, a defendant sought to have his sentence reversed because of 
the use at a capital sentencing proceeding of psychiatric 
testimony taken in violation of the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at 253-
54.  In support of his position, the defendant relied on the 
following statement from Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489 
(1978):   
[W]hen a defendant is deprived of the presence and 
assistance of his attorney, either throughout the 
prosecution or during a critical stage in, at least, 
the prosection of a capital offense, reversal is 
automatic.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); 
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963). 
 
 The Satterwhite Court, however, refused to adopt such a 
categorical rule, noting that the Court had previously approved 
harmless error analysis in a number of cases involving violations 
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of the Sixth Amendment.  See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 
(1972) (harmless error analysis applied to confession obtained in 
violation of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)); 
Monroe v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977) (harmless error analysis 
applied to admission of identification testimony obtained in      
violation of right to counsel at postindictment lineup); see also 
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (harmless error applied to 
violation of right to counsel at preliminary hearing).  Rather, 
the Satterwhite Court distinguished Holloway stating that 
reversal was automatic only when the "deprivation of the right to 
counsel affected--and contaminated--the entire criminal 
proceeding."  486 U.S. at 257.   The Court thus held that where a 
reviewing court could make an "intelligent judgment" as to the 
effect that the constitutional violation could have on the 
sentencing jury, harmless error analysis applied.  486 U.S. at 
258.  See also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2083 
(1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting that the Supreme 
Court has "long since rejected the argument that, as a general 
matter, the Sixth Amendment prohibits the application of 
harmless-error analysis in determining whether constitutional 
error had a prejudicial impact on the outcome of the case"). 
 I also note that one other court of appeals has indicated 
that an invalid waiver of counsel at sentencing is subject to 
harmless error analysis.  Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d 753 (5th 
Cir. 1984).  Cf.  Golden v. Newsome, 755 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 
1985) (denial of right to counsel at sentencing not subject to 
harmless error analysis); United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485 
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(9th Cir. 1987) (denial of right to counsel at hearing on motion 
to withdraw guilty plea and sentencing not subject to harmless 
error analysis). 
 In conclusion, I emphasize that I express no view as to 
whether the unconstitutional deprivation of counsel at sentencing 
can be harmless.  That is precisely my point:  without any need 
to decide this question and without briefing or argument on the 
issue, I refuse to endorse the majority dictum. 
24 
 
 
